Abstract. In this paper we cryptanalyze two protocols: the Grigoriev-Shpilrain authentication protocol and a public key cryptosystem due to Wang, Wang, Cao, Okamoto and Shao. Both of these protocols use the computational hardness of some variations of the conjugacy search problem in a class of noncommutative monoids. We devise a practical heuristic algorithm solving those problems. As a conclusion we claim that these protocols are insecure for the proposed parameter values.
Introduction
The conjugacy search problem plays a special role in group-based cryptography (see [2, 24, 25] ). Most of the cryptosystems based on groups use one or another variation of that problem. For instance: [16] employs conjugacy search problem in braid groups; [4] employs shifted conjugacy search problem in braid groups; [1, 36] employ simultaneous conjugacy search problem in braid groups; [34] employs twisted conjugacy problem; [31, 32, 35] employ decomposition problem in different (semi)groups; [30] employs conjugation and exponentiation in matrix groups.
The mentioned above schemes use the complexity of variations of the conjugacy search problem over different algebraic structures. The complexity as well as the methods used for the analysis of such cryptographic schemes vary dramatically depending on the underlying algebraic structure and its representation. For
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A. D. Myasnikov and A. Ushakov instance, analysis of braid-based schemes use the property of the braid group B n to be linear and the generic convexity properties of the random subgroups. Analysis of the scheme based on the Thompson group F uses a smart representation of elements of F as certain directed graphs.
Most of the protocols mentioned above are currently broken, see [6-9, 12, 13, 17-23, 26-29, 33] . But the search of a secure platform (semi)group continues. In this paper we consider two new protocols proposed in [10] by Grigoriev and Shpilrain, who introduced two authentication protocols: one is called the beta protocol and the other is called the full protocol. The security of both protocols relies on the hardness of the conjugacy search problem in a semigroup of matrices over truncated polynomials. The semigroup of 2 2 matrices over truncated onevariable polynomials over Z 2 has already appeared as a platform for an authentication scheme in [34] and was broken in [9] using techniques based on Gröbner bases. In [10] Grigoriev and Shpilrain update parameter values to make the computation of Gröbner bases infeasible and defend against Grassl-Steinwandt attack. They claim:
Our platform semigroup might be the first serious candidate for having generically hard conjugacy search problem.
The goal of this paper is to show that the claim is false. Informally, generic case complexity is the complexity on "almost all" of the inputs, see [14, 15] . We prove that the claim is not true and, in fact, the conjugacy search problem is trivial in most of the cases (see Theorem 2.3). Trying to find difficult instances of the problem we modify the method of key generation. Our modification allows to generate nontrivial instances of the conjugacy search problem, but even that does not make the protocol secure, we show that it can be attacked by a certain heuristic algorithm (see Section 3).
We also discuss a related work by L. Wang, L. Wang, Z. Cao, E. Okamoto and J. Shao (see [37] ) which proposes a non-commutative version of Diffie-Hellman type encryption protocol which uses conjugation in the same class of monoids as the Grigoriev-Shpilrain scheme, and demonstrate their inadequacy.
The Grigoriev-Shpilrain authentication scheme
Here we introduce basic notions and formulate the conjugacy search problem together with the main security assumptions used in [10] . Fix N; m; n; k 2 N. The Grigoriev-Shpilrain authentication protocol uses a semigroup of n n matrices over N -truncated polynomials with coefficients in Z m . An N -truncated polynomial over a ring Z m is an element of the factor algebra The value K is the main security parameter here and, hence, should be sufficiently large to provide a necessary level of security. That implies that the order of the cyclic subgroup generated by X must be at least K. Similarly we define the associated decision problem:
CSP-based decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G . Given elements A, X, X s AX s and X t AX t in G, for some 1 Ä s; t Ä K, distinguish elements X s t AX sCt and X l AX l for some random l 2 OE1; K with probability cryptographically-significantly better than 1=2.
To use these protocols, a concrete class of non-commutative monoids must be chosen. Wang et al. suggest using the semigroup of n n matrices over N -truncated polynomials with coefficients in Z m , as above. We cryptanalyze this instantiation of the protocol of Wang et al. in Section 4.
Parameter values
Both papers, [10] and [37] , use almost the same set of parameters. They use the semigroup G of 3 3 matrices of 1000-truncated polynomials in 10 variables over Z 11 (in [10] ) and over Z 12 (in [37] ). To be consistent with the notation above, we have n D 3, N D 1000, k D 10 and m D 11 or m D 12. Precisely, [37, p. 11] states:
According to [15] , we can choose the parameters as follows: D 3, D 1000 and k D 10, while the ring R is instantiated with Z 12 . The citation " [15] " references the Grigoriev-Shpilrain protocol [10] discussed above. The choice of Z 11 or Z 12 gives different algebraic structures with, perhaps, very different algorithmic properties. To have a more complete picture, we analyze the protocol from [37] for both cases: Z 11 and Z 12 in Section 4.
Our contribution
The main contribution of this paper is a heuristic algorithm for solving the conjugacy search problem in matrices over a semigroup of N -truncated polynomials. The heuristics used in the algorithm allow us to solve the conjugacy search problem on a majority of inputs generated using the parameters proposed in [10, 37] which invalidates the security claims. We also argue that the proposed sampling procedure with high probability generates trivial instances of the conjugacy problem.
In the following sections we argue the validity of the assumptions above with the main focus on solving the conjugacy search problem in G. In Section 2 we discuss in more detail the sampling procedures proposed in [10] and emphasize the flaws in the construction of the problem instances. In Section 4 we show that the protocol of Wang et al. is neither secure nor feasible for the proposed parameter values. In Section 3 we describe our heuristic algorithm for the conjugacy search problem in the semigroup of matrices over truncated polynomials and provide experimental results.
Key generation
In this section we discuss the key generation procedures for protocols mentioned in the introduction. Both use two matrices A and X , where X is invertible.
The matrix A is somewhat similar to the base element in the Diffie-Hellman protocol and, in particular, the simpler A the faster the computations. To make computations more efficient it is suggested in [10] to use 5-sparse polynomials, 100 A. D. Myasnikov and A. Ushakov i.e., polynomials with five monomials. A random 5-sparse polynomial is generated by selecting five random monomials of degree at most N 1.
The matrix X is generated as a product of matrices:
where E ij .m/ is an n n matrix that differs from the identity matrix I by one nontrivial off-diagonal polynomial m 2 R in the position .i; j / (with i ¤ j ). We can assume that m i 's used in the generation of X are monomials because for any 1 Ä i ¤ j Ä 3 and polynomials m 1 ; m 2 2 R we have
The monomials m l and indices i l ; j l are chosen randomly. It is easy to check that the matrices E ij .m/ are invertible and
In the next subsection we discuss some crucial observations and flaws of the proposed generation procedure with respect to the assumptions above.
Sparse truncated polynomials chosen uniformly randomly make CSP trivial
The original paper [10] does not state explicitly how to generate random monomials used in the generation of entries for A and E i;j .m/. On the other hand mentioning the generic case hardness in one of the claims implies that they are generated uniformly. Hence, each m is a sum of five monomials ax i 1 : : : x i s where a is uniformly chosen from Z 11 n ¹0º;
x i 1 : : : x i s is uniformly chosen from the (finite) set of power product over ¹x 1 ; : : : ; x 10 º of power up to N D 1000.
Proposition 2.1. The following hold:
(a) The probability that a uniformly randomly chosen power product has degree smaller than 500 is 0:00102107974.
(b) The probability that a uniformly randomly chosen 5-sparse polynomial involves a monomial of degree less than 500 is approximately 0:0051.
(c) The probability that a uniformly randomly chosen matrix A involves a monomial of degree less than 500 is approximately 0:0450.
Proof. The number of power products of degree at most d in k variables is Proof. Under the conditions of the lemma, all monomials ma ij in formula (2.1) will be of degree 1000 or more, and so these monomials are truncated to zero. Theorem 2.3. The probability that X 1 AX D A for randomly chosen matrices A and X is not smaller than 0:90750.
Proof. The matrix A is randomly chosen and involves 45 monomials; then it is conjugated by 50 random elementary matrices. The probability that at all steps no monomial of degree less than 500 will appear is .1 0:00102107974/ 95 0:90750:
By Lemma 2.2 in this event we have X 1 AX D A. Since we considered only a subset of all events that result in equality X 1 AX D A the actual probability of obtaining a trivial conjugacy equation is even higher.
Therefore, for the suggested generation method the conjugacy search problem is trivial on most of the inputs. That does not mean that there are no difficult instances of CSP, but the key generation procedure is bad. Trying to find hard instances we modified the procedure for generating random monomials. Instead of choosing the monomials uniformly, it randomly uniformly chooses the degree of the monomial and then the required numbers of the involved variables are chosen. As above, N 1 is the maximal degree of a monomial and k is the number of variables. The procedure is the following:
Algorithm 2.4 (Monomial generation).
1: Choose the degree s from ¹1; : : : ; N 1º uniformly randomly. 2: Choose numbers i 1 ; : : : ; i s from ¹1; : : : ; kº uniformly randomly. 3 : Choose a coefficient a from Z 11 n ¹0º uniformly randomly. 4: Output the monomial ax i 1 x i 2 x i s .
Algorithm for solving the conjugacy problem
In this section we present a heuristic procedure for solving the conjugacy search problem in G. Recall that, given two matrices A and C D X 1 AX in G, our goal is to compute a conjugator X . Essentially, our heuristic is a variation of a length-based attack that has been successfully used several times in group-based cryptography (see [7, 11, 19, 26, 27] ).
General idea of the attack
Since X is generated as a product of elementary matrices E 1 E 2 E n , the matrix C can be viewed as a result of a sequence of conjugations by the matrices E i :
The goal is to reverse the sequence (3.
Clearly, the problem above is not very well defined because any elementary matrix E could have been used to obtain C i from the unknown C i 1 . We find the matrix E which fits the best for the role of the conjugator. This is done using the concept of a size function.
Size function attack
The following function will guide our process of recovery of elementary conjugators.
Definition 3.1. The size of a polynomial f 2 R is the total number of monomials in f , denoted size.f /. The size of an n n matrix M is the total number of monomials in all entries of M :
For polynomials p; q 2 R define a number p .q/ to be the number of power products in p that are not present in q. Similarly, for matrices A; B 2 G define a number
Intuitively, this function indicates how much one matrix is contained in the other. A .B/ is positive only if a new monomial cancels out some old monomial. Therefore, the number of choices for m that induce cancelation of some old monomial can be bounded above by 7 size.A/ 2 . Since the monomial m is chosen as a product of a random nonzero coefficient and a random power product, and since the total number of random power products is jB Z 10 .1000/j, it is easy to get the claimed bound on Pr. A .B/ D 0/.
In fact, in Proposition 3.2 we proved a stronger result. We proved that with high probability every new monomial in a conjugate matrix was not involved in the original matrix. Next, the trivial estimate Proof. Excluding all events when all the new monomials have power greater than 999 and, hence, being truncated (the trivial case for conjugacy) we obtain the same estimate as in Corollary 3.3.
We consider size 10 5 because we think that bigger matrices are not practical. By Corollary 3.4 the main assumption of the length based attacks,
holds for the majority of elements A; E ij .m/ 2 G. Hence, given a matrix C k we find a conjugator as the matrix E ij .m/ which gives the least value
Here we encounter another challenge. The number of the elementary matrices E ij .m/ can be bounded below as 6 10 jB Z 10 .1000/j 10 27 ; we cannot simply enumerate them and test which ones reduce the size of the current matrix C i . In the next subsection we discuss a method reducing the number of the elementary matrices that need to be tested.
Reducing the number of the elementary matrices for tests
In this section we show, given a matrix of the form
how to find a small number of candidates for .i; j; m/. We perform our procedure for all different values of i; j separately, so, here we only consider the values i D 1, j D 2. Other cases are similar. For a polynomial f 2 R we denote by Mon.f / the set of all monomials involved in f , and for a pair of polynomials f; g 2 R we define Frac.f; g/ to be the set of monomials Let min.f / denote the minimal short-lex degree monomial in f 2 R. The next theorem immediately follows from the discussion in Section 3.2.
m/, C i 1 ¤ C i and size.C i 1 / Ä 10 5 , then with probability at least 1 10 15 the monomial m belongs to the following union: The same bound works in all the other cases: jM st .C i /j Ä 2 size.C i / for every s ¤ t (explicit formulas for M st .C i / can be found in Appendix B). Define the corresponding set of elementary matrices
It follows from Proposition 3.5 that with probability at least 1 10 15 the true conjugator E st .m/ belongs to the set M st .C i /. The set E st .m/ can be further reduced using Proposition 3.2:
Finally, we combine the sets E 0 st .C i / together to obtain the set
called the reduced set of candidate elementary matrices. The following bound holds:
(In general jE.C i /j Ä n 2 size.C i /.) Given a matrix C i , the set E.C i / can be computed in quadratic time in terms of size.C i /.
The results
Algorithms 3.6 and 3.7 are the two components describing the heuristic procedure for solving the conjugacy search problem in G. This procedure is similar to the best descent variation of the length-based attack proposed in [27] . Compute E.B/.
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5:
Find
Algorithm 3.6 attempts to find the minimal matrix in the conjugacy class of a given matrix B. If we give the matrix B D X 1 AX as the input to Algorithm 3.6 then we expect matrix Y to be the best candidate for the solution to the corresponding conjugacy search problem. However, the matrix Y may fail to be the solution in the case when A is not minimal, i.e., there is an elementary matrix that may reduce the size of A itself. One extra step of reducing the size of A is needed and it is implemented in Algorithm 3.7 which solves the conjugacy search problem in G. return FAIL. 7: end if Algorithm 3.7 receives a pair A, B D X 1 AX as the input. If it successfully finds a conjugator Y (not necessarily equal to X) then it outputs Y , otherwise a failure is reported. We tested the effectiveness of the procedure described above by executing Algorithm 3.7 on sets of instances of the conjugacy search problem generated using Algorithm 2.4.
Algorithms were implemented in C++ using the "CRyptography And Groups" (CRAG) library (see [3] ). Since the size of input significantly depends on the number of elementary matrices used to generate the conjugator, experiments were performed for different lengths of the product. There were 100 instances generated using each value. Experiments were performed on a desktop PC with eight core 2.67GHz Intel i7 processor and 6 gigabytes memory.
The results of our experiments are shown in 30% of instances generated using products of 50 elementary matrices were broken. This is the most hard case because of the size of the matrices in the conjugacy search problem. We want to point out that though we have considered matrices with 10 5 monomials in our proofs above, matrices of size 10 4 are already not very practical. It takes about 103 bits to store a single 1000-truncated monomial in 10 variables. Hence, public keys obtained using products of 50 elementary matrices will require several megabits of storage on average.
Analysis of Wang et al. primitive
In this section, we discuss properties of the protocols of Wang et al. with the semigroup of n n matrices over N -truncated polynomials with coefficients in Z m as a platform. The first observation is that the CSP-based Diffie-Hellman problem in G and the CSP in G do not seem to be closely related. Indeed, the CSP-based Diffie-Hellman problem in G is very restrictive because the conjugators come from the cyclic subgroup generated by X. The problem is only to recognize the power of X used in conjugation. CSP-DH can be reduced to the conjugacy search problem relative to a subgroup generated by X (cf. [33] ), but we do not see how it can be reduced to the general CSP in G. 
which happens if and only if OEOEY 1 ; X t ; A D 1 which is a nontrivial grouptheoretic identity (obviously implied by OEX; Y D 1 that can be efficiently tested). Therefore, CSP-DH can be efficiently reduced to the conjugacy search problem when C A is small and can be efficiently enumerated. Also, we do not see how one can reduce the general CSP to the CSP-based DH problem. Therefore, computational hardness of any of these problems does not imply hardness of the other.
The main problem however is with the CSP-based Diffie-Hellman assumption in the semigroup G. Recall that the order ord.X/ of a group element X is the smallest positive integer m such that X m D I . All protocols of Wang et al. require computation of powers X i for large values of i so that i cannot be recovered from the triple .A; X; X i AX i / by simple enumeration. The requirement above implies that the order of the conjugating element X must be large. Indeed, let ord.X/ D m and i > m. We can write i D m k C r where r < m. Then
Therefore, X r is an equivalent solution to the problem. In particular, since r < m, the problem can be solved by exhaustively testing all powers of X up to X m , and so m D ord.X/ must be large. Next we present empirical evidence that ord.X / is small most of the time. First of all if we use the uniform random approach of Grigoriev-Shpilrain, then using the argument similar to Theorem 2.3 one can show that most of the instances of X have small (in fact trivial) orders.
More surprisingly, similar behavior is observed when X is generated using Algorithm 2.4. We performed a series of experiments and were able to compute the order of every instance of the matrix X. Moreover, in the case when the polynomial coefficients were taken from Z 11 , all instances had orders 11, 121 or 1331 with 121 being the most frequent. Notice that these are all powers of 11 which is the order of the polynomial coefficients. In the case of Z 12 the orders were more diverse with 31 104, 62 208 and 124 416 being the greatest but each occurring only once. Orders 72 and 144 were the most frequent and all values were multiples of 12. One explanation for the relatively small orders of X is that the terms of the polynomials are eliminated due to the small finite order of the coefficients.
We have to mention here that, since the monomials are chosen randomly with the uniform distribution on the degrees, the number of monomials in X i grows very fast in terms of i (we can not say exponentially fast because we work with a finite, though huge semigroup). So the scheme is neither secure nor practical regardless of the generation procedure.
One can try to increase the order by introducing different sampling strategies. We performed experiments where monomials from R were chosen randomly with the degree N=5 D 200 at most. The idea is that introducing smaller degree polynomials will make truncation less common. Indeed, the size of power matrices became times larger than in the previous experiments. However, the orders of such matrices were again some small powers of 11. 
A Elementary conjugation formulas

